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Cert to CA 4
(Haynsworth, Winter,
Widener) (p/c)

JACKSON (convicted murderer)

v.
VIRGINIA
1.

Federal/civil(Habeas)
SUMMARY:

Timely

Petr urges the Court to decide whether the rule of

Thompson v. City of Louisiana, 362

u.s.

199 (1960), that a federal court

in a habeas proceeding must deny the writ if, in the state trial, there
was "some" evidence to prove each element of the offense, is too narrm11
in light of the court's decision in In re WinshiE, 397
2.

FACTS:

u.s.

358 (1970).
he was
Petr and Mrs. Cole, whom petr had met while/in prison,

went for a drive one afternoon.

Both petr and Cole had been drinking and

- 2 were "pretty well loaded."

Petr had a revolver with him, and there was

a butcher knife belonging to Cole in the front seat of the car: all the
accounterments for a quiet Sunday drive.
boisterous.

While at a diner, petr became

A sheriff noticed the gun and asked that petr give him the

gun until petr sobered up.

Cole insisted that they were going "straight

home," and the sheriff allowed them to leave without confiscating the
gun.

From this point on, the facts are based on a statement given to

the police by petr after his arrest.
wished to have sex with petr.

While driving home, Cole said she

He refused, whereupon Cole attempted to

stab him with her knife and stated that if she couldn't have him no other
woman could.
revolver.

Jackson pushed her away and hit her with the butt of his

He then left the car and crossed the street to call a taxi.

While awaiting the cab , Cole drove up and persuaded petr to reenter the
car.

They then drove to a secluded church and began "messing around"

and drinking.

At this point cole, who was naked from the waist down,

and petr were outside the car.

According to petr, Cole again sought

sexual relations with petr and upon petr's refusal, she again attempted
to attack him with the knife.

To warn her away, petr said that he fired

the revolver into the ground six times, which emptied it.

He then broke

the revolver open, emptied the six shell casings, which police officers
later found, and reloaded.

He stated that when the gun was reloaded,

Cole attempted to wrest the pistol from him and that during the scuffle,
the revolver accidentally discharged, killing Cole.

Cole was shot

twice; one bullet passed through her left breast and the fatal bullet

- 3 -

passed through the left side of her ches,t.

Petr fled the scene but

was picked up later in Florida, at which time he made the statement to
police.
Petr was convicted of first degree murder in a trial before the
court {Gates) and was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

He appealed to

y

the Virginia Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.

Thereafter,

petr sought habeas in the E.D. va. and the DC (Warriner) granted the
writ.

Apparently,

(the DC's opinion is not attached to the petn), the

DC found that there was insufficient evidence in the record to prove
premeditation, an element of the offense of Ml.

The CA 4 reversed.

The

court stated that under the rule of Thompson v. City of Louisiana, supra,
a federal court must deny the writ if there was "some" evidence to prove
each element of the offense.

It rejected petr's argument that after

In re Winship, supra, a habeas court can deny the writ only if there was
evidence to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
After reviewing the evidence,the court found that there was "some" evidence of premeditation.

It noted that under Virginia law, the

requiremen-~

of premeditation is met if the necessary intention exists immediately

any

before the fatal blow is struck~ it need not exist for /
period of time.

appreciable

In the court's view, the fact that petr was so un-

Petr doesn't state whether he raised in the state courts the constitutional claims he is now pursuing and the issue is not directly discussed by the CA in its opinion, which is the only opinion appended to
the petition. The CA did refuse to consider certain contentions that had
been raised in the petn for habeas corpus because they had not been raisec
in the state courts, and I take it from that statement that petr's current
claims were raised in the state courts. App. at 9 n. 3.

- 4 threatened by Cole that he had sufficient time within which to reload
his revolver and the fact that she was shot twice constituted some evidence of an intention on his part to shoot her.

That a single shot might

have been fired accidentally might be believable but that a second was
fired accidentally after Cole already had been struck was "incred:ible."
warranted
The court held that the judge was
/
in finding that petr was not
so intoxicated as to negate premeditation and pointed to the fact that
the sheriff did not think petr so drunk that he should not be allowed to
leave the diner in the possession of a revolver.

Also, the court rejecte c

petr's contention that the judge's finding of premeditation was based
on erroneous inferences from photographs of Cole's partially decomposed
body taken after it was found by police.

There was some evidence to

support the ultimate finding of premeditation and there was only a
suggestion that the judge may have been partially misled in his factfinding process.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

First, assuming that Thompson v. c:ity of Louisj ana

is still the law, petr argues that the CA 4 erred in finding that there
was "some" evidence to support the element of premedi·t ation.

Principally,

petr argues that his intoxication negated any premeditation.

The autopsy

of cole showed that at the time of her death her blood alcohol level was
.17%, which is well in excess of that deemed necessary to prove intoxication.

Petr claims that his blood alcohol level was surely at least as

high as Cole's.

He points out that the revolver was an automatic so that

the number of shots fired cannot prove premeditation.

- 5 Petr next contends that a habeas court must find more than simply
"some" evidence to support each

element~

rather, it must satisfy itself

that the trier of fact was warranted in finding each element beyond a
reasonable doubt.

He argues that any holding to the contrary in Thompson

was overruled, sub

sil:~ntio,

in In re Tflinship, supra, where the Court

stated, "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 11

He contends that this

due process protection would be meaningless if only
considered sufficient.

'~orne"

evidence were

In petr•s view, a court could not conclude that

the element of premeditation was proved beyond a reasonable doubt in
~~

this case, unless the court•s finding was based, as petr suggests, on
improper inferences dra'lm from gruesome photographs of Cole • s body.
4.

DISCUSSION:

The only possibly certworthy question is whether

the CA was correct in applying the rule of Thompson v. City of Louisiana
in light of In re Winship.

If the CA was correct on this issue, the only

question left is a fact specific, sufficiency of the evidence claim.
There certainly appears to have been "some" evidence of premeditation,
as set forth by the CA.
In Thompson, the Court, reviewing petr•s conviction in state court,
stated that the "ultimate question presented to us is whether t.he charges
against petitioner were so totally devoid of evidentiary support as to
render his conviction unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause
Decision of this question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence,

- 6 but on whether this conviction rests up(;>n any evidence at all."
U.S. at 199: accord, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382
Garner v. Louisiana, 368

u.s.

157, 163

(1961)~

dence to support Thompson's conviction.
364

u.s.

362

87, 94 (1965);

The Court found no evi-

In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,

(1970), the Court held that the "Due Process Clause protects the

accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
In his dissent from the denial of cert. in Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429
U.s. 1111,

(1977) (75-6898), Justice Stewart suggested that the "no evi-

dence" rule of Thompson should be reevaluated in light of the pd nciples
announced in In re Winship o

He urged that the standard should be whether

there is sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding by the
trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

In his view the

sufficiency of the evidence standard was of const i tutional dimensions
and habeas courts were bound to apply it.

If the Court is inclined to

reevaluate the standard set forth in Thompson, this case would appear
to be as good a case as any.

Neither petr nor the CA 4 pointed to any

split in the circuits on this issue, however.
There is no response.
10/4/78
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January 5, 1978 Conference
List 5, Sheet 5
No.

78-5283

Motion of Appointment of Counsel

JACKSON

v.
VIRGINIA
Carolyn Colville asks for appointment as counsel to represent
petr before this Court, although she is not yet a member of the bar
of this Court.

She was appointed to represent petr by CA 4, and

prepared and signed the cert petn.
Applicant graduated from the T.C. Williams School of Law
(Richmond, Va., 1976), is admitted in Virginia (1976), by the DC
(ED va.),

and CA 4, and has been engaged in the general practice of

law since June 1976.
Miss Colville will seek admission to this Court as soon as she
lS
I

\.......-

eligible (in about six months).

The Clerk suggests that this case

will be sc he duled for argument in March.
12/15/78
PJC

Marsel

...,.....
3/5/79

r.FP /lab

r•• F. P. , Jr •
No. 78-S283

Jackson v. Virginia

In Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.R. 199 (1960),
the Court

h~ld

that on

fe~era1

habeas corpus review of a

state conviction the writ should be denied if there was
"some 11 evidence to prove each element of the offense.
In dissenting in 1977 from denial of cert in
Fn~eman

v. Zahradnick, 429

u.s.

that in liqht of Winship, 397

1111, ,Justice Stewart arqued

u.s.

358 (1970), the rule of

Thompson should be reexamined with the

to chanqinq

vi~w

habeas corpus standard to require evidence

11

beyond all

reasonable doubt" with respect to each element of the
offense.

We took the present case to consider the question

raised hv Justice Stewart.
In this case Jackson was convicted, in
Chesterfield County, Virginia, of first-deqree murder (not
capital murder) of a woman when they were on a drinkinq
spree

toqeth~r.

sex.

As there were no witnesses, the evidence was entirely

circumstantial.

The killing occurred in an arqument over

In Virginia, Premeditation does not mean

that the murder was planned •

.:;.;

No particular interval of time

• J

•

~-

.

..

'

2.
is necessary.

Here, the woman was shot twice in

circumstances which - as I view the

~vidence

- makes

Jackson's account of an accidental killing quite incredible.
Thus, I suppose this case could be

d~cided

on the ground

that the conviction should be affirmed even on a reasonable
doubt standard.
If, however, we reach the issue that promoted us
to grant, I would like your thinking.

As I do not have the

books here (my apartment}, I have not reread Winship.

My

recollection is that it dealt with the requirements of proof
at trial rather than upon habeas corpus review.
brief also says that
Louisiana, 368

u.s.

u.s.

~mpson

The state's

was reaffirmed in Garner v.

157 and Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382

87, and has been followed by most of the federal courts

of appeal.
A theoretical argument in favor of the reasonable
doubt standard is appealing.

The standard distinguishes our

leqal system from that of most other countries in the world.
But it is a standard applicable to trial, and direct review.
I am not persuaded that the purpose of - or the policy
underlying - federal habeas corpus review of state
convictions requires a de novo examination of the
sufficiency of the evidence to the extent of applying the
strictest standard of proof.
There are strong policy reasons of federalism and

L.
..
l
I

"

~·

' .
:I

3.
finality that support Thompson.

The possibility of an

innocent person being convicted of a felony (and whose
conviction is not set aside either on appeal or upon habeas
corpus) is infinitely remote under our elaborate system of
appeals.
The theoretical argument to the contrary is,
however, not frivolous.
evidence

t~an

If the state conviction is on less

the reasonable doubt standard requires, there

has been a denial of due Process.

Thus, the case presents a

choice between the symmetry of a uniform standard, on the
one hand, and the history, practicalities and policy
arguments on the other.

L.F.P., Jr.

'

>

~141rnnr <!Jour! of fqr :JlniJrl'l ~hurtl

Jlln.o frnt ~ton. :ID. <!f. :::!.n,sn ~~
April 4,

197Y

PERSONAL

Re:

78-5283 -

Jackson v. Virginia, et al.

Dear Harry:
The vote in this case will effect, as I see it, a
monumental change in the concept of federal review of
state criminal cases on collateral attack.
Lewis is particularly distressed about this case, and
I suppose that is so partly because of Stone v. Powell,
for the two cases have a common, underlying theme.
This
is another one of the cases where, coming to us as the
fifth court dealing with the relatively simple matter, we
are on the threshold of making a very important change
which could impose heavy burdens on federal courts.
In
dealing with a collateral attack on a state conviction
confirmed by the highest court of the state, the federal
role up to now was to do no more than determine whether
the fundamental "rules of the club" have been followed by
the state.
Of course, there is no question about the burden of
proof at trial, but the Winship case added nothing to the
long-established American rule of burden of proof in
non-civil cases.
Every state in the Union has followed
that standard since the beginning of the Republic.
The
Winship case did no more than say that this universally
accepted idea was constitutionally based.
It will add an
enormous burden to the District Courts if a collateral
attack under § 2255, or by way of habeas corpus, requires
-- or permits -- the District Court to reweigh the
evidence to decide whether a federal judge would have
reached the same result.

·,·, .,,

.:Su:vrtUU Qiourl of tlf.t ~ttiftb, ~tatts
Jhtsltittgttttt. ~. QI. 2llp~.;l
April 5, 1979

CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia
Dear Chief:
I am not sure that I understand the import of your letter
of April 4, for it seems to me to embrace a misapprehension about
my vote at the Conference.
When this case was discussed, I said this:

1. 1 felt that Winship changed the rules or at least raised
a warning flag with respect to Thompson v. Louisville. The dissents in Freeman v. Zahradnick, 429 U.S. 1111, surely indicate
that this view was entertained by three Justices who participated in
Winship.
2. I do not accept the California suggestion that the Winship
clai may not have been raised in the Virginia courts. I also am
not persuaded by the California argument that Stone v. Powell should
be extended to foreclose sufficiency of the evidence claims. This,
for n e, would be too great an expansion of Stone. Further ore, a
claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence goes to the heart of the
judicial process and the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence.
3. If the standard of Thompson v. Louisville is to apply,
this case is a cle r affirm.
4. For me (but apparently not for others), if Winship imposed standards different from Thompson for habeas review, then
under Winship, too, this case is a clear affirm. The facts are
devastating. There is no direct evidence of how drunk ackson was.
The deputy did not take his gun away from hi and thus could not
have thought he was very drunk. He was sober enough to reload the
gun under stress. His version of the struggle, in light of the physi·
cal evidence, is incredible. The victim was shot twice (shades of

- z~

v. New York Life Ins. Co.). He fled all the way to Florida.
When he returned from Florida, he did not go back to Virginia but
stayed in North Carolina ..

5. The easy way to dispose of this case would be to say
that under either standard an affirmance is in order.
6. We did not take thh case, however, just to pass judgment on its particular facts (I voted to deny certiorari), but to
straighten out the Thompson- Winship confusion which has been
with us now too long. I therefore could face the issue and decide
it. I do not share your feeling that the Winship approach would
effect "a monumental change. ' 1 There would be some state court
irritation, of course (witness Kentucky v. Wharton), but the burden on the federal courts would not be a great one. They would
be applying the same standard of review they routinely apply in
federal cases.
I say again that the easy way to resolve this particular
case ie to affirm it under whichever standard applies and let it
go at that. No one else around the conference table seemed to
agree; all appeared to take the one extreme view or the other
extrerr.e view. Just where I shall end up on the final vote depends
on the writing. The crux, I think, came when Winship was decided in 1970. I was not here then, but I well recall how surprised I was that a case of that kind was decided at so late a date.
Because your letter indicates that you have discussed this
I am sending a copy of this letter to him. If
you wish, I shall circulate something to this general effect to the
other members of the Court. They may well share the same misapprehension as you do about my vote. I thought at the time of
the Conference, however, that it was perfectly clear and that 1
was in the middle between the two "camps. "
~

i ~it,

Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
cc: Mr. Justice Powell

'k?1?-1!/

..§npunu Clfonrl of tqt~h _inmg
:J~Jagqmghtn. ~.

<!f.

20bi'1-~

CHAMeERS Of"

THE CHIEF .JUSTICE

April 23, 1979

PERSONAL
Dear Harry:
Re:

78-5283

Jackson v. Virginia

In your memorandum of April 5, final paragraph,
you inquired whether you should "circulate something
to this general effect .... "
I am inclined to think this might be useful and
give Lewis a chance to be heard on a case which, as the
only "true ·blue Virginian" implicates him perhaps
specially.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
be:

Mr. Justice Powell

Dear Potter:
Please show on the next draft of your opinion that
I took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Sincerely,
\, ii

lfp/ss
cc:

t'

The

f-/'

' ·- ¥:'~'
-~; '-4-~~-· \ 1' '·

',::

'

~upunu

<!fomi o-f Urt 'J!tniub- ~brltll'

...M'.fringhm. ~. <!f. 20,?'!~
CHAMBERS OF

J USTI CE JOHN PA U L STEVENS

May 24, 1979

Re:

78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

Dear Potter:
As I believe I have already indicated, I will
be dissenting. Because I regard this as an
exceptionally important case, it may take me a
little while to organize my thoughts.
At the moment, I am not entirely clear as
to whether your "rational trier of the fact" standard
is to be equated with a sort of rational basis equal
protection standard which presumably would be satisfied
by any evidence--in which event the case may be a
tempest in a teapot--or the new ·standard is one that
will require federal district judges and Courts of
Appeals to review the entire transcript of every state
criminal trial whenever an allegation of insufficient
evidence is made.
I am fearful that the lower courts
will give your opinion the latter interpretation and
that the increased burden on the Judiciary that will
flow from this decision may well do more to encourage
judicial resignations than the failure to pay judges
decent wages.
Of even greater importance, I think your basic
analysis is flawed.
For i f Winship means that every
finding of guilt must be supported by a quantum of
proof that satisfies a constitutionally required
r~a~onable doubt stand~rd, I should think it would

- 2 -

follow that appellate judges and habea~ judges should
also be satisfied that guilt has been satisfied beyond
a reasonable doubt.
if you reject this conclusion
because we must place some faith in the system when the
trial has been fair in all other respects, I do not
understand why we cannot continue to trust the system
we have been using up to now.
Surely your citation of
Clyatt (which applied the any evidence standard), and
Glasser and Bronston, (neither of which involved a reversal
for 1nsufficiency of evidence) on page 8 of your opinion
do not demonstrate any need to develop a new standard of
review.
In any event, as these hastily dictated comments
indicate, I do feel very strongly about this case and
I hope you will bear with me if I take more time .than
is sometimes appropriate for dissenters.
Respectfully,

jL

Mr. Justice Stewart
Copies to the Conference

'

. ·'·

~u:p:rmtt

<!fontiof tlrt~b ~fattg
Jfag fringLnt. ~. QJ. 2Il~Jt. ~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

May 25, 1979

Re:

No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

Dear John,
I had understood that you would be dissenting in this
case, and I await your dissenting opinion with interest.
Please feel under no time pressure whatever.
At the moment, let me simply say that it seems to me
that your concern respecting the impact of this decision,
so picturesquely expressed in your letter, is extravagantly
unrealistic. This is not a "new standard," but one which
trial judges have routinely had to apply in dealing with
motions for acquittal and one that appellate judges have
routinely applied in dealing with claims of insufficiency
of the evidence. See,~·~·, Judge Prettyman's opinion in
Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232. In an adversary
system, where the applicant for habeas corpus has the burden
of proof, I doubt there would be any measurable increase
in the burden upon federal district judges.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

,.'

..

.

~

'

,§uprmtt ~ttmt of tqt 'Jttnitd! :§tatts
~lt9 Jrhtghttt. :!0. <!I. 2llgt~ ,;l
CHAMBERS OF

May 29, 1979

.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

Re:

I

78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia, et al.

Dear Potter,
I shall, of course, be interested in
what John writes but for now and likely for
the long pull, I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice stewart

Copies to the Conference

erne

•

j5u:pumt <!Jtturlttf ffrt %tiltb j5ta.U.t¥
Jfa,glpttghm. ~. <!f. 20~'1-~
CHAMBE RS OF

JUSTICE

w .. .

May 3l, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR.

/

I
I

I

·l

RE:

No. 78-5283 Jackson v. Virginia

Dear Potter:
I agree.
Sincerely,

. I~
Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference

.II

_,I -=---

~.

- - " -----=-

.

-

-:~-::--

- ....

·---':::::'"~-

-

---- -~-

;

~ttprtntt

Qfcttrl of tlrt ~t~ ~taftg
jiufrhtg~ Ifl. <!}. 2ll~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 6, 1979

Re:

No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

v

Dear John:
Please join me in your dissent in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference

·.
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THE CHIEF" .JUSTICE

Re:

June 12, 1979

78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

Dear John:
I join your dissenting opinion.
Regards,

Mr. Justice Stevens
Copies to the Conference
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June 20, 1979

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

Re:

No. 78-5283 - Jackson v.

~inia

Dear Harry:
Thank you for your letter of today. I
agree with you that a rational trier of fact could
have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of first degree murder under Virginia law•
Accordingly, I shall recast part IV to enable you
to join the opinion, trusting that those who have
already joined it will also go along.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 20,1979

/
Re:

No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

Dear Potter:
I have read and reread your and John's successive
writings on the two sides of this case, and I write now to
set forth where I come out.
I originally voted to deny certiorari in this case.
I
did so because I felt that on the lurid facts this was not
a very good case to rationalize and resolve the respective
foundations of Thompson v. Louisville and In re Winship.
Despite the fact that there have been no new or clarifying
developments since certiorari was granted, I could easily
vote to DIG this case.
You and John, however, have invested time and hard
work, and that time and hard work are not easily set aside.
The facts are devastating. Petitioner's story isbasically incredible. There is no direct evidence of how
drunk he really was. He was not drunk enough for the
deputy to have taken his gun away. He was sober enough to
reload the weapon under stress. He shot his victim twice
(this brings to mind the parallel two-shot fact situation
in Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 u.s. 437 (1959),
and-my-vivid recollection of the Eighth Circuit's unanimous outrage at its reversal in that case.)
Petitioner
left his victim in the parking lot without seeking assistance. He fled to Florida. When he left Florida he returned only to North Carolina and not to Virginia. He
attempted to sell th~ victim's car.
It therefore seems to me that under any standard whatsoever, whether that of Thompson or that of Winship, a
rational trier of fact could have found petitioner guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.

- 2 Thus, it seems to me that the proposed disposition of
the case is an e~ercise in legal theory that does not have
much critical bearing on this particular petitioner. In
Part IV of your opinion you conclude that the application
of the correct criterion to the evidence is appropriately
left to the Cou(t of Appeals. This normally is the kind
of disposition n6 one can properly criticize. But, for
me, on the facts of this case .it seems to be rather futile.
We did otherwise in Fare v. Michael c., decided only today.
I indicated at Conference that so far as the analysis
between Thompson on the one hand and Winship on the other
is concerned, my sympathies are with your side of the argument and, in a "proper" case I believe I would so vote.
The bottom line in this case for me, however, is to affirm.
I could, of course, write something to the effect that
I agree with your analysis, or even formally join Parts I,
II, and III of your opinion, but refrain from joining Part
IV and cast my vote to affirm the judgment of the Fourth
Circuit. This is not a very satisfactory solution from an
institutional point of view. Other alternatives are to
regard the case as affirmed by a equally divided vote (and
wait for a better case which is sure to come), or to let
the case go over the Term for reargument when Lewis will be
able to participate. This obviously is something ~o be
discussed tomorrow.

Mr. Justice Stewart
cc: The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF'

June 22, 1P,79

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE

j
Re: No. 78-5283 - Jackson v. Virginia

Dear Potter,
As before, I am still with you.
Sincerely yours,

Av~

Mr. Justice Stewart

Copies to the Conference
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